Possibilistic logic is a quantitative method for uncertainty reasoning which is closely related to Zadeh's fuzzy set theory. In this paper, we formulate it as a kind of multimodal logic and develop some proof methods for it, including tableau method and two styles of natural deduction methods. The completeness and soundness of these methods are proved. Finally, some potential applications and the possible research directions are pointed out.
Introduction
In the last thirty years, many uncertainty reasoning schemes have been proposed by logicians, scientists and engineers. Among them, possibilistic logic, which is proposed by Dubois and Prade 7] and is closely related to Zadeh's fuzzy set theory 29] , is one of the most important approaches. The logic arises naturally in the following scenario 5].
Consider a state-descriptive information system(SDIS) = = hU; PV i, where U is the set of all possible states of the world under consideration, and PV is a set of propositional variables which describe somethings about the world. For each u 2 U, assume that u is complete with respect to PV in the sense that for each p 2 PV , p is either true or false under the state u, we will write u(p) = 1 (resp. =0) if p is true (resp. false) under state u. Then, the truth set of the proposition p, written as jpj, is de nied as the set of all states u such that u(p) = 1. Let us de ne a query formula f to the SDIS as a Boolean combination of the propositions in PV . The truth value of f under a state u is completely determined by the classical logic truth table and the truth values of the propositional variables under u. Thus, the de nition of the truth set can be extended to any queries accordingly. Now, if a piece of fuzzy information is stored in the SDIS, then the truth value of a formula f can be determined according to the stored information. A piece of fuzzy information is de ned as a fuzzy subset (i. e. a possibility distribution) of U. Then, the resolution rule of possibilistic logic is de ned between two possibilistic clauses as follows:
(f w 1 ) (g w 2 ) (R(f; g) w 1 w 2 ) where R(f; g) is the classical resolvent of f and g, and is de ned by Example 1.1 Consider the assumption set B = f(p^q( 0:7)); (p^q r (N 0:6))g and the w f = (r ( 0:7)) in possibilistic logic. Then obviously, f should be derivable from B. 1 However, since (p^q ( 0:7)) is not a possibilistic clause, the resolution rule can not be applied. A possible approach to overcome the di culty may be to infer (p ( 0:7)) and (q ( 0:7)) rstly.
This indeed improves on some situations if the second sentence is either (p r (N 0:6)) or (q r (N 0:6)), but it is useless for the present example To lift the restriction of clausal form, we must consider more general deduction methods. Some non-clausal deduction methods for modal logics have been well studied by Fitting 13] , so by formulating possibilistic reasoning as a kind of multimodal logic, we can generalize Fitting's methods to possibilistic logic. Recently, some modal formulations of possibilistic logic have been proposed 12, 21] . Here, we will review one of them, called quantitative modal logic(QML), and develop some nonclausal deduction methods for it. These include tableau methods and natural deduction methods.
In what follows, we will rst review the syntax and semantics of QML. Then the advantages of QML in possibilistic reasoning is discussed. A basic theorem for the completeness of QML deduction methods, called model existence theorem, is proved in section 3. The above-mentioned proof methods are presented in section 4 and 5 sequentially. Finally, some related works are discussed and a brief conclusion is given.
Quantitative Modal Logic

Syntax
To de ne a new logical language, we must specify its syntax and semantics.
First, the alphabet of QML consists of logical constants, connectives and a (denumerable) set of propositional variables.
Logical constants: > (verum or truth constant ) and ? (falsum or falsity constant ). Propositional variables: p; q; r; , etc. We usually use lower case letters (sometimes with indices) p; q; r to denote atomic formulas and f; g; h to denote w s. In the present case, w s are also called sentences. Parentheses are punctuation symbols used to avoid ambiguity in the formation of w s. The formala \f g" is taken as an abbreviation of \(f g)^(g f)". Now, we introduce some notations which will be used later.
De nition 2.1 Let S be a set of w s. Then Also, Sub(f) = Sub(ffg) and V (f) = V (ffg) if f is a single w . Note that if S is nite, then Sub(S) and V (S) are, too. Furthermore, an atomic w or its negation is called a literal.
Following the ideas in 13], we may classify the non-literal w s of QML into six categories according to the formula's main connective which is used to combine its direct subformulas. The classi cation will simplify the presentation of de nitions and theorems in section 3. We list the six categories of w s and their corresponding subformulas in 
Semantics
Here we consider the semantics of QML. De ne a possibility frame F = hW; Ri, where W is a set of possible words and R : W 2 ! 0; 1] is a fuzzy accessibility relation on W. Let PV and FA denote the set of all propositional variables and the set of all w s respectively. Then a model of QML is a triple M = hW; R; TAi, Where hW; Ri is a possibility frame and TA : W PV ! f0; 1g is a truth value assignment for all worlds. A proposition p is said to be true in a world w i TA(w; p) = 1. Given R, we can de ne a possibility distribution R w for each w 2 W such that R w (s) = R(w; s) for all s 2 W. Similarly, we can also de ne TA w for each w 2 W such that TA w (p) = TA(w; p) for all p 2 PV . Thus, mathematically, a model can be equivalently written as hW; hR w ; TA w i w2W i, and intuitively, TA w describes the ontological state of the world w, while R w re ects the epistemic state of the world w.
Given a model M = hW; R; TAi, we can de ne the truth relation j = M W FA as follows. First, for each world w and w f, let w (f) = sup s2W fR w (s) j s j = M fg and N w (f) = 1 ? w (:f)
(1) w j = M p , TA(w; p) = 1; 8p 2 PV , (2) w j = M > and w 6 j = M ?, (3) w j = M :f , w 6 j = M f, (4) w j = M f^g , w j = M f and w j = M g, (5) w j = M f _ g , w j = M f or w j = M g, (6) w j = M f g , w j = M :f or w j = M g, (7) w j = M hcif , w (f) c, Table 2 : w s and their component formalas 1 2 f _ g f g :(f^g) :f :g f g :f g (8) w j = M hci + f , w (f) > c, (9) w j = M c]f , N w (f) c, (10) w j = M c] + f , N w (f) > c. Clauses (7)-(10) de ne the meaning of w s with modal operators. Intuitively, c]f (resp. c] + f) means that N(f) c (resp. N(f) > c), and similarly, hcif (resp. hci + f) denotes that (f) c (resp. (f) > c). Here, for convenience, we de ne sup ; = 0 and inf ; = 1.
A w f is said to be valid in M = hW; R; TAi, writen j = M f i for all w 2 W; w j = M f. If S is a set of w s, then j = M S means that for all f 2 S, j = M f. If C is a class of models and S is a set of of w s, then we write S j = C f to mean that for all M 2 C, j = M S implies j = M f. A model with nite possible worlds is called nite model. A model is called serial i for all w in W, sup s2W R(w; s) = 1, and re exive i for all w in W, R(w; w) = 1. Throughout this paper, we use K, D, and T to denote the class of all models, serial models, and re exive models. If C is a class of models, then FC denote the class of all nite models in C. We also note that T D K.
We can also see from the semantics that the main di erence between QML and possibilistic logic is the former allow di erent possibility distributions for each world w, that is R w , while the latter associate a constant possibility distribution to all worlds. Thus, we have enhanced the expressive power of standard possibilistic logic. For example, if from some information source, we get a rule \ Smoking implies the possibility of cancer being at least 0.8", but the certainty (necessity) of the rule is at most 0.7 due to the reliability of the information source, then we can represent this fact as : 0:7] + (p h0:8iq), where p and q denote \smoking" and \being cancered" respectively. Furthermore, the syntax make it easier to combine QML and other intensional logic. For instance, we can use Bh0:6ip and h0:6iBp to represent \the agent believes that the possibility of p is at least 0.6" and "the possibility of the agent believing p is at least 0.6" respectively. Recently, a complete axiomatic QML system for reasoning about higher order uncertainty have also been proposed 22] . This shows that QML has indeed some advantages on the representation of complex uncertainty w s.
QML and Possibilistic Reasoning
To understand the relation between QML and possibilistic logic, we rst show that all axioms for possibilistic logic can be realized in all serial models in the following sense.
Theorem 2.1 (1) It can be checked that for any w f, if f 2 F, then the corresponding component formulas f 1 and f 2 (in the case of f being or w ) or f 0 (in the other cases) are all in F by the requirement of F = Sub(G). This simple fact is critical to the well-de nedness of the consistency property since we require that is a subset of 2 F .
Obviously, the consistency property is closely related to the satis ability of w s. The intuition is formally stated as the following theorem. However, before the presentation of the main theorem, let us illustrate these de nitions with a simple example. The following corollary is proved in 21] by the soundness and completeness of the axiomatic systems.
This corollary is useful in the correctness of proof methods developed later and in the proof of the decidability theorem for QML. We will only consider the decidability theorem in this section, and devote the following sections to the development of the proof methods. As above, we assume L = K; T, or D, and let B be a nite set of w s, f be a w , and F = Sub(B ffg). Lemma 3.5 B 6 j = L f i there exists a B-compatible L-consistency property on F such that f:fg 2 . Proof: (( part) This is just a restatement of Theorem 3. = fS F j w j = M S; w 2 Wg We can show that is a B-compatible L-consistency property. Then, by the de nition of , we have f:fg 2 . As for the process of verifying that satis es the appropriate conditions in De nition 3.2, it is routine. We only point out that the niteness of M is used in the veri cation of condition (k1) and (d), and leave the detail to the reader.2 Theorem 3.2 The problem \ B j = L f ? " is decidable. Proof: Since F is nite, we can test each subset of 2 F to see whether it is a B-compatible L-consistency property (by checking the appropriate conditions in De nition 3.2) and whether f:fg 2 (by membership test). Since each test step is decidable and the process is nitely terminating, the problem is decidable. 2 
Tableau Method for Analytic Systems
Let L = K; D, or T. De ne the analytic system L as the set of all w s f such that j = L f. The remainder of the paper is devoted to the development of di erent proof methods for analytic systems. In this section, we rst consider the tableau method. This is essentially a proof-tree construction approach. In this method, an attempted proof of a w is to place the negated form of the w as the root of the proof tree, and tableau rules are applied to extend the branches of the tree until some closed condition is encountered, or no more rules are applicable. Then, if all branches of the tree is closed, then the w is proved as a theorem of the system. Otherwise, an open branch of the tree will construct a countermodel of the w . In fact, in the presentation of Fitting's tableau method for ordinary modal logic 13], the model existence theorem is derived intuitively from the method by considering the consistency property as the collection of possible open branches. The main feature of the analytic systems is that the tableau rules are completely dependent on the component formulas of the parent node. Thus, if we label nodes of the proof tree by the w s derived according to the rules, every node of the proof tree is labelled by a w in Sub(f), where f is the label of the root. Consequently, the proof tree is nite, and the proof process will terminate. These systems are named as analytic just because we can derive the proof of a theorem by analyzing the structure (i. e. the subformulas) of the theorem to be proved.
Tableau Method for Propositional Logic
In Smullyan 26] , the tableau methods for propositional logic has been extensively developed. Then, Fitting 13] successfully extends the method to modal logic. Here, we rst recall Smullyan's method. Then in the next subsection, we prove the soundness and completeness of the tableau method for QML's analytic systems.
Smullyan's method is consist of a set of tableau rules. When some branch of the proof tree contains the premises of some rule, the conclusions of the rule can be added to end of the branch. Essentially, there are two kinds of rules. The rst ones, the extension rules, are to add the conclusions to the end of a branch direectly, and the added nodes are organized as a branch and attached to the end of the original branch. The second ones, the forking rules, are to add the conclusions as the sons of the end node of the original branch. In the propositional case, all forking rules have exactly two conclusions, so one is the left son and the other is the right son, and our proof tree is binary. The tableau rules for propositional logic 13] is presented in Figure  1 . Observing that all premises of the extension rules are w s and all premises of the forking rules are w s, we can summarize the tableau rules of propositional logic into two rules in accordance with the classi cation of propositional w s. In other words, the tableau rules are the following and rules.
rule : rule :
Now, a tableau (or a proof tree) is a labelled binary tree whose nodes are labelled by w s. For convenience, we identify the nodes of a tableau with their labels. A tableau rule is applicable to a tableau when some branch of the tableau contains the premise of the rule. After the application of an rule, the new tableu is obtained by attaching the conclusions to the end of the branch to which the rule is applied, where one conclusion is the son of the old branch end, and the other conclusion is the grandson of it. After applying a rule, the new tableau is obtained by attaching the two conclusions as the left and right son of the old branch end. Thus, a tableau rule transforms an old tableau into a new one. However, the transformation is nondeterministic, i.e., there may be many rules applicable to a tableau in the same time and one real application of them results in the new tableau. A derivation is thus a sequence of tableaus T 1 ; T 2 ; ; T n such that T 1 is a single node (called the root) tree, and T i is the resultant tableau of applying some rule which is applicable to T i?1 for each 1 < i n. A branch in a tableau is called (classically) closed if it satis es one of the following three conditions:
It contains p and :p for some propositional variable p It contains ? It contains :> A tableau is called (classically) closed if each branch of it is closed. A tableau proof for a w f is a derivation T 1 ; T 2 ; ; T n such that T 1 is a single node labelled as :f and T n is closed. We will use`P L t f to mean that there exists one tableau proof for f.
Tableau Methods for QML Analytic Systems
The tableau method for propositional logic is also called semantic tableau method because the tableau rules re ect the truth conditions of any w s in a given world. For example, rule means an w is true in a world i its component w s are both true in the world. However, when we turn to QML, we will need to consider the truth condition of w s in di erent worlds.
For example, by possible world semantics, if h0:5i + f is true in a world w, then there exists one world w 0 such that R(w; w 0 ) > 0:5 and f is true in w 0 . Thus, we need to process the truth set in di erent possible worlds.
The most obvious approach is to allow the creation of alternate tableaus during the course of a derivation. This may be accomplished by allowing the nesting of tableaus, and the resultant proof procedure is just a combination of tableau method for propositional logic and the recursive call mechanism. In other words, we start with an attempted proof of a w in QML, and the classical tableau rules is applied unproblematically, but when a modal w is derived in the course, we may also switch to an alternate world, and the proof is continued in the alternate world. The di culty of this method is that we need to keep a lots of alternate tableaus in the same time, and the proof will get rather complex even a simple w is given at the beginning of the proof.
Fortunately, for the analytic systems, having jumped from one world to another, we do not need to go back again. This suggests that in the tableau methods for these systems, if we create an alternate tableau at some point in the course of a derivation, we can forget about the earlier tableau to which it is an alternate. Thus we only need to consider a single tableau at any given time.
Observing this, Fitting suggests a further simpli ccation. Rather than actually creating alternate tableaus and discarding the old tableau, we could simply update the original one to re ect conditions in each current world as we pass through it. This save the time to duplicate the common parts of the old and the new tableaus. However, what might these updating rules be like. Consider the w h0:5i + f occurring on a branch of a tableau. Intuitively, the w is true in the current world w under consideration. Thus, there should be a world w 0 such that R(w; w 0 ) > 0:5 and f is true in w 0 . Suppose we want to update the branch to re ect a jump from the world w to w 0 . Then, obviously, we should add f to the end of the branch. But the question is, in general what additional information may we take with us in such a jump? The answers may be di erent for di erent logics. In the case of the system K, let S be the set of w s occurring on the branch to be modi ed, then by the de nition of possible world semantics, K(S; 0:5) should be all true in the world w 0 . Thus, we should cross out all w s in this branch and add K(S; 0:5) ffg to the end of it. In some cases the w s to be added is a subset of the original branch. In those case, we just cross out the unnecessary w s, and remain the needed w s.
However, because of the way of the tableaus being written as a tree, it may happen that a branch is to be modi ed and part of it is common to several other branches which are not to be modi ed. In this case one can add to the ends of the branches that are not to be altered fresh occurrences of the w s that will be crossed out, then the above-mentioned process of crossing-out and addition can be executed unproblematically.
Thus, in addition to the and rules, QML analytic systems contains tableau rules listed in Figure 2 .
We can use the classi cation of w s to simplify the presentation of the tableau rules as follows:
1. rules Next, we will construct the correctness and completeness of the tableau methods. But before continuing, let us consider a rule in some details to see why the tableau rules are correct intuitively. Consider the hci + rule. The premises of the rule are S fhci + fg, i.e. the w s in this set are true in some world w. This implies that there exists a world w 0 such that R(w; w 0 ) > c and f is true in w 0 since by de nition, sup u2W fR(w; u) j u j = M fg > c. However, any w g in the set K(S; 1 ? c) satis es that 1 ? c]g is true in w since by the premises S is true in w. This in turn implies that for any world u such that u j = M :g, R(w; u) c. Thus :g must be false in w 0 , i.e. g is true in w 0 for any w g in K(S; 1 ? c). This argument verify that there exists one world such that the conclusions of the hci + are true in it. However, the problem arise when we consider the hci rule since sup u2W fR(w; u) j u j = M fg c does not implies the existence of a world w 0 such that R(w; w 0 ) c if the set W is in nite. Fortuntely, we have Corollary 3.1, which tells us that it is su cient to consider only nite models.
To construct the soundness result, we need some de nitions. Let L = K; D, T and S be a set of w s. Then S is called nitely L-satis able under assumption B i there exists a nite model M = hW; R; TAi in L such that j = M B and there exists a world w 2 W such that w j = M S. A branch of a tableau is nitely L-satis able under assumption B i the set of uncrossed-out w s on it is. A tableau is nitely L-satis able under assumption B i there exists one branch of it which is so. We now have the following lemma. we can apply rule to S rst and the resultant tableau is a single branch containing all w s in S f 1 ; 2 g. Consequently, there is a closed tableau for S after all, and this is a contradiction.
(b) if 2 S, S f 1 g 6 2 , and S f 2 g 6 2 , then there are closed tableaus for S f 1 g and S f 2 g respectively. Then we can apply rule to the initial tableau for S, and then derive the two closed tableaus for the two branches respectively. Since in our modi cation rules, the part to be crossed out which is common to other branches is copied to those branches, the derivation of the two branches do not interfere with each other. Thus the nal tableau is a closed tableau for S. . In general, the natural deduction method is a kind of forward reasoning method in which we deduce conclusions from some assumptions, and then these assumptions are discharged according to some deduction rules. The nal form of the conclusion may be a conditional sentence. Thus, the main characteristic feature of natural deduction methods are that we can make assumptions at any point of the deduction process, deduce things from them, and later discharge the assumptions.
According to the description above, the natural deduction system will contain some assumptiondischarging rules. Generally, the rules of a natural deduction system may be classi ed into two kinds. One are the elimination rules in which the conclusions are structurally simpler than the premises because of the elimination of some connectives. The other are the introduction rules in which the conclusions are structurally more complicated than the premises because of the introduction of connectives. The rules to discharge assumptions are in general a kind of introduction rules since discharging some assumptions will make the conclusion more complex to express the assumptions explicitly in the conclusion.
There are di erent formats to express a natural deduction proof. Here we will choose the one developed by Fitting 13] for modal logic and modify it to meet our need.
First, a deduction is a sequence of w s in boxes. The rst item in a box is an assumption and other w s in a box are derived according to the rules of the natural deduction systems. The boxes may be nested. When a new assumption is introduced, a new box must be created, with that assumption as the rst item of the created box. On the other hand, when an assumption is discharged by the assumption-discharge rules, a box created for the assumption should be closed o , and the conclusion is written just below the box. A natural deduction proof (abbreviated as proof throughout this section) is a deduction in which all assumptions have been discharged.
Although the boxes may be nested, they should not be overlapped. In other words, a box should be closed o only when all boxes inside it have been closed o . A w f and a box B are said to be at the same nest level if B and f are inside the same box directly. Here, \directly inside a box B" means \ inside B, but not inside any boxes inside B".
The natural deduction rules for classical logic 13] is presented in Figure 3 . The last line of a proof is the w that have been proved by the deduction. The global assumption rule with a set of w s B is that any member of B may be used as a line at any point of the deduction. We write B`P L n f to denote that there is a proof of the w f with the global assumption B in the classical natural deduction system. Some important properties of classical natural deduction system have been studied extensively. We restate some of them from 13] for the sake of reference.
Lemma 5.1 1. If B; f`P L n g and B; :f`P L n g, then B`P L n g. Now, we can develop the natural deduction method for the QML analytic systems on the classical deduction basis. We call a deduction or derivation in a box as a subordinate deduction (or just subdeduction). To develop the natural deduction method for the QML systems, we 1. Iteration rule: in a deduction, if f and box B are at the same nest level and f occurs above B, then f may be repeated directly inside the box B.
2. Contradiction rules: f :f ? :> g g g need another kind of boxes. The original kind of boxes represnts the subdeduction under some assumptions, while the new kind of boxes represent a subdeduction in a possible world. Since our possible worlds are connected by a fuzzy accessibility relation, we must be able to re ect the strength of the connection between two worlds. We say a world w 0 is c-accessible (resp. c + -accessible) from the world w i R(w; w 0 ) c (resp. R(w; w 0 ) > c).
Thus, we have two types of boxes in the QML natural deduction systems. The type 1 boxes are just those of the classical natural deduction system. The type 2 boxes are labeled by c or c + where c 2 0; 1]. Intuitively, the deduction process proceeding in a possible world, while entering a type 2 box labelled with c or c + means to start a deduction in a new possible world which is c-accessible or c + -accessible from the original world. Type 1 boxes and type 2 boxes are distinguished by their labels. If a box has no any label, then it is a type 1 box, otherwise, it is a type 2 box. When we are doing deductions in a possible world, we may want to jump to another world to do some deductions. There are al least two ways to do this. The rst choice is to do deductions in a generic world which is c-accessible from the present world for some c. When returning from the new world, we get some general results about any worlds which are c-accessible from the present world, and the results are used in the present world to deduce other results. The other choice is to do the same thing in a particular world, and if we can derive some contradiction in the particular world, then the contradiction can be returned to the present world. Thus, two styles of QML natural deduction systems are induced. If the former approach is adopted, the obtained system is the so-called A-style natural deduction system. If we follows the latter approach, the resultant system is called I-style system. We will discuss the two styles of systems in the following subsections.
I-style Natural Deduction System
The I-style natural deduction systems for K; D, and T include all inference rules of the classical natural deduction system. However, any rules involving boxes (i.e. the iteration rule and the introduction rules) refer only to the type 1 boxes. Thus, we must develop some rules for type 2 boxes. The following is a complete list of the common rules for I-style natural deduction K; D, and T systems:
1. Type 2 box creation rule: if a w (c) (resp. + (c)) occurs in the course of a deduction, a type 2 box with label c (resp. c + ) may be created. The created box is at the same nest level as the occurrence of (c) (resp. + (c)), and 0 (c) (resp. + 0 (c)) is put at the rst line of the box. Furthermore, we have special rules for the system D and T. The special rule for T is directly presented in Figure 4 . The special rule for D is as follows: one may creat a type 2 box labeled with 1 at any point of the deduction. For convenience, the rst line of the so created box is >.
Schematically, these rules are presented in Figure 4 The de nition of deduction, proof, and global assumption rule is almost same as that for classical logic. However, we require a proof is a deduction in which all boxes (type 1 or 2) have been closed. We use B`Li f to denote that f has a proof in the I-style system for L under the global assumption rule with set B. It is easy to construct the completeness of the I-style systems, so we consider it rst.
Theorem 5.1 Let B be a nite set of w s and f be a w . Then B j = L f implies B`Li f Proof: First, let F = Sub(B ffg), and = fS F j B 6 L i V S ?g. We will verify that ia a B-compatible L-consistency property. Then, if B 6 L i f, then f:fg 2 . Otherwise, B`Li :f ?, and by E and the reverse rule, we have B`Li f after all. Thus, by model existence theorem B 6 j = L f.
To verify that ia a B-compatible L-consistency property, we go through the following steps.
First, the veri cation of conditions (a) and (b) follows from Lemma 5.2. Second, condition (c) can be veri ed by using^E, contradiction, and I rules.
To verify condition (k1) and (k2), we present only one case of them, and the other is similar.
assume c > 0 and (c) 2 S 2 , but K + (S; 1 ? c) f 0 (c)g 6 2 , then the following is an I-style natural deduction proof of B`Li V S ?. Furthermore, is B-compatible because of the global assumption rule. 2
The soundness of I-style systems is intuitively obvious. However, to construct the formal result, we need some more de nitions.
De nition 5.1 Given an I-style deduction for the w f under the global assumption B. We can de ne the set of assumptioms alive at line n, A(n), for each line of the deduction as follows: Note that in each box of a deduction, there are two kinds of assumptions alive. The rst one is that induced by the creation of a type 1 box, and the second one is those imported from the outside. According to the de nition above, when we enter a type 1 box, the two kinds of assumptions are both included in the set of alive assumptions. However, when we enter a type 2 box, all assumptions outside it are forgetten. Thus, the alive assumption set in fact depends on the world in which we are doing deduction. 
A-style Natural Deduction System
The A-style natural deduction system still contains the classical deduction rules. It also use two types of boxes. The classical rules involve only type 1 boxes, while the rules for type 2 boxes are di erent from those for the I-style system. The di erences between the A-style system and the I-style system are listed as follows:
1. The (type 2 box) creation rule: a type 2 box with label c(0 < c 1) or c + (0 c < 1) may be created at any point of the proof. For convenience, the rst item of the created box is >. The other rules, including the type 2 box iteration rules, contradiction rules, and the special rules for the system T, are completely same as those of I-style natural deduction system. The global assumption rule with set B is de ned as above. The de nition of deduction and proof is also same as that for I-style system. We use B`La f to denote that there is a proof of f in the A-style system under the global assumption set B. Then the completeness theorem is constructed as follows. 
Resumption of the Example
We can now return to Example 1 to see how di erent proof methods are used to derive the expected results. First, we give a tableau proof for it.
:h0:7ir 0:6](p^q r) h0:7i(p^q) :r p^q r p^q p q :(p q) r :p :q Each horizontal line represents an application of some tableau rule. The applied rules from top to bottom are two global assumption rules, one (0:7) rule, one rule and two rules respectively.
Next, we show a I-style natural deduction proof for the same example. In this section, we consider some related work on modal approach to uncertainty reasoning.
First, Dubois et al. 9] give an intriguing semantic account of possibilistic logic based on incomplete states of knowledge, and they also suggest the graded modal operators 2 c and 3 c , which are roughly equivalent to our 1 ?c] + and hci. However, their semantic unit is a complete or incomplete state of knowledge, so the accessibility relation betwee two states means the precisiation relation, while according to the discussion in section 2.2, our accessibility relation (i. e. the collection of all R w ) means the total epistemic states.
Second, Farinas del cerro and Herzig 12] also formulate possibility logic as a multimodal logic PL P , where P is a nite subset of 0,1]. PL P is essentially equivalent to our system D. However, there is no completeness result for PL P being established. Furthermore, they de ne a conditional formula f g to denote (f) (g) and show that f g can be transalted into a w of PL P . However, the given translation is not truth-preserving. That is, it is possibile that f g is false but the resultant w is true.
Third, Catach 4] considers some axiomatic schemata for general multimodal logics. Though his results can be applied to di erent intensional logics, such as epistemic, doxastic, temporal, dynamic logics and their combination, however, it seems that he only allows a nite set of atomic modal operators and then forms other modal operators from this nite set by composition and union. On the other hand, in QML, we have a set of modal operators whose cardinality is @ 1 , so his results can not be applied to our case directly.
Finally, in probabilistic logic, there are some similar approaches, notably that of Fagin and Halpern 10]. However, due to the additivity of probability measure, it seems di cult to develop complete proof method for modal probability logic other than the axiomatic system.
Future Directions
Although the presentation of the paper have almost reached the end, this is by no means the termination of the QML research. There are still works remaining to be done. Among them, we list some possible research directions of QML.
First, the proof methods for analytic systems should be implemented to test the e eciency of the methods. We consider the natural deduction methods as the most easily implemented one since the box structure of natural deduction methods is very like the block structure of computer program language. However, the tableau method may be more e ecient since the backward reasoning characteristic of it guarantee the convergence of an attempted proof. Of course, our inference rules are essentially non-deterministic, so some heuristics and control strategies for proof tree search should rst be developed. Furthermore, other styles of proof methods may also be considered, such as the resolution method 1] and matrix proof method 28].
Second, we should consider the extension of QML to predicate logic. This will enhance the expressive power of our language. However, the proof methods and completeness will become far more complicated than the present case.
Third, QML is essentally a kind of intensional logics 14], so it is possible to combine QML with other intensional logics. In particular, we will be interested in the combination of QML with temporal logic 2] and with epistemic logic 15]. A logic for reasoning about knowledge and probability have been successful developed by Fagin et al. 10] . Therefore, we believe the combination of QML with epistemic logic and with temporal logic will produce more fruitful results due to the intensional feature of QML.
Finally, the logic program paradigm for QML may be considered. The extensions of logic programming to including modal logic 11] or possibilistic logic 6] have been explored by some researchers respectively. It seems that QML may provides a framework to integrate the two extensions.
Of course, other research directions are also possible, and we can not enumerate all of them here. We just emphasize once again that the analogy between possibilistic and modal reasonings will provide very fruitful results for uncertainty reasoning research. Since 1912, C.I. Lewis 20] opened the door to the modern modal logic, it has been about eighty years old, while possibilistic logic is at most in its teens. The links between them revealed by QML show that the trace of growth of the old discipline may provide much experience and insight into the younger one.
